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KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
 Over the course of the last four years, Appellants 
Garfield Gayle, Neville Sukhu, and Sheldon Francois have 
been litigating, and the Government, defending, a purported 
class action to challenge the constitutionality of 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1226(c), the section of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
that requires the mandatory detention of aliens who have 
committed specified crimes.  The parties’ significant 
investment of time and effort culminated in partial grants and 
partial denials of summary judgment and two thoughtful and 
thorough opinions of the District Court that are now the 
subject of able briefing by the parties and amici on appeal.  It 
is especially unfortunate, then, that when it ruled on the 
merits, entered injunctive relief on Appellants’ individual 
claims, and then denied class certification on the ground that 
it was not “necessary” in view of that injunction, the District 
Court put the cart before the horse as to both federal 
jurisdiction and our class action jurisprudence.  That is, once 
Appellants were released from detention, their individual 
claims became moot so the District Court retained jurisdiction 
only to rule on Appellants’ motion for class certification—not 
to decide the merits issues, much less to order individual 
relief.  So too is our appellate jurisdiction limited to the denial 
of class certification.   
 Because the District Court exceeded its jurisdiction by 
adjudicating the merits issues and also adopted a doctrine of 
“necessity” to deny class certification instead of analyzing the 
criteria enumerated in Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, we will vacate the judgment and the relevant 
orders of the District Court and will remand for further 
proceedings.  
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I. 
A. 
 Appellants are foreign nationals and Lawful 
Permanent Residents of the United States.  As a result of 
various state-law criminal convictions, the United States 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) sought to 
remove each Appellant from the United States.  Pending their 
removal proceedings, each was detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1226(c), which provides that where ICE has “reason to 
believe” that an alien is “deportable” or “inadmissible” by 
virtue of having committed one of a number of specified 
crimes or being involved in activities threatening national 
security, that alien “shall” be taken into custody “when the 
alien is released [from detention for those crimes], without 
regard to whether the alien is released on parole, supervised 
release, or probation, and without regard to whether the alien 
may be arrested or imprisoned again for the same offense.”1  
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c); In re Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799, 803-05 
(B.I.A. 1999); see also Sylvain v. Att’y Gen., 714 F.3d 150, 
152 (3d Cir. 2013).  The mandatory detention provision of 
§ 1226(c) stands in contrast to the general rule that when the 
Government seeks to detain an alien pending his removal 
proceedings, he may seek a bond hearing to show that he 
should not be detained.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); In re Guerra, 
24 I. & N. Dec. 37 (B.I.A. 2006); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(b).  
Each Appellant sought relief from his mandatory detention.   
                                              
 1 The sole exception to mandatory detention lies where 
the Government believes release is necessary to protect a 
witness.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(2). 
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 At issue on appeal are the District Court’s rulings on 
Appellants’ Third Amended Petition,2 filed on August 5, 
2013, and their third motion to certify a class, filed on May 
12, 2014.3  The Third Amended Petition raised individual 
claims on behalf of Sukhu and two claims on behalf of a 
putative class of aliens who are being or will be mandatorily 
detained pursuant to § 1226(c).  The first such claim alleged 
violations of substantive and procedural due process.  
Mandatory detention of aliens violates substantive due 
process, Appellants contended, when the alien has a 
“substantial challenge” to his removal—that is, when he 
challenges whether the crime for which he was convicted 
renders him removable or when he claims he is entitled to 
discretionary relief in the form of cancellation of removal or 
adjustment of status.   
 Appellants’ procedural due process claim challenged 
the procedures surrounding so-called “Joseph hearings,” the 
mechanism by which an alien who is mandatorily detained 
                                              
 2   The first petition for habeas corpus was filed by 
Gayle individually in May 2012 urging that he be given a 
bond hearing because ICE violated the dictates of § 1226(c) 
by not detaining him immediately after he was released from 
state custody.  In November 2012, a First Amended Petition 
was filed, including individual claims for relief for Sukhu, as 
well as claims brought on behalf of a putative class.  The 
Second Amended Petition, filed in May 2013, added claims 
for Francois.   
 
 3   As discussed in more detail below, the first motion 
to certify was filed in November 2012.  The second motion to 
certify was filed in February 2014. 
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pending his removal proceedings is provided “with the 
opportunity to offer evidence and legal authority on the 
question whether the Service has properly included him 
within a category that is subject to mandatory detention.”  In 
re Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 805.  Specifically, Appellants 
asserted that an alien who is mandatorily detained pursuant to 
§ 1226(c) is allowed to “seek[] a determination by an 
immigration judge that [he] is not properly included within” 
§ 1226(c).  8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(2)(ii); see also In re 
Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 800 (holding that an alien is 
entitled to a bond hearing if he can show at a Joseph hearing 
that the Government is “substantially unlikely to establish, at 
the merits hearing, the charge or charges that subject the alien 
to mandatory detention”).  Appellants alleged (1) that aliens 
do not receive adequate notice of their right to a hearing, (2) 
that Joseph hearing procedures impermissibly place the initial 
burden of proof on the alien, and (3) that a contemporaneous 
verbatim record should be made of each Joseph hearing. 
 In connection with their request for relief, Appellants 
also sought to certify a class “consisting of all individuals in 
New Jersey who are or will be detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1226(c).”  First Mot. to Certify (D.Ct. Dkt. No. 13).  
Appellants relied on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23(b)(2), which allows plaintiffs to bring a class action when 
“the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on 
grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final 
injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is 
appropriate respecting the class as a whole.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
23(b)(2).  The District Court ruled on the merits of the claims 
brought on behalf of the class in two stages.  In an order and 
opinion dated March 14, 2014 (Gayle I), the District Court 
partially granted the Government’s motion to dismiss and 
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held that § 1226(c) did not violate substantive due process 
with respect to aliens who assert a substantial challenge to 
their removability.  The District Court thus dismissed 
Appellants’ petition “to the extent that [Appellants] are 
requesting that a Joseph hearing be provided to any 
mandatorily detained alien who has a ‘substantial challenge’ 
to his or her removal on grounds other than whether the alien 
falls within the § 1226(c) categories requiring mandatory 
detention.”  Gayle v. Johnson, 4 F. Supp. 3d 692, 721 (D.N.J. 
2014).4 
 In an order dated January 28, 2015 (Gayle II), the 
District Court resolved the remaining claims—i.e., the 
adequacy of Joseph hearing procedures—on cross-motions 
for summary judgment, and also ruled on Appellants’ motion 
to certify a class.  As to the merits, the court held (1) that the 
form giving aliens notice of their right to seek a Joseph 
hearing (“Form I-286”) does not provide constitutionally 
adequate notice and that the Government was required to 
revise the form; (2) that Joseph hearing procedures violate 
due process by not placing the initial burden on the 
Government, but that once the Government shows probable 
cause to believe that the alien is subject to mandatory 
detention, the burden shifts to the alien to show that the 
Government is “substantially unlikely to prevail” in proving 
the alleged charges; and (3) that due process does not require 
a contemporaneous recording of a Joseph hearing.  See Gayle 
v. Johnson, 81 F. Supp. 3d 371 (D.N.J. 2015).   
                                              
4 Because Francois did not challenge whether he fell 
within a § 1226(c) category, the court then dismissed 
Francois for lack of standing.  Gayle I, 4 F. Supp. 3d at 721. 
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 The District Court judge then addressed the third 
motion to certify a class, having denied the first motion in 
May 2013 “without prejudice pending an expanded record 
and/or discovery,” Gayle v. Warden, 3:12-cv-02806, ECF No. 
50, at 2 (May 13, 2013), and having terminated the second 
motion in connection with her March 14, 2014 opinion by 
instructing Appellants to refile a motion “limited to those 
individuals who are entitled to a Joseph hearing consistent 
with this Opinion,” see Gayle I, 4 F. Supp. 3d at 721-22.  
Appellants did so, redefining the class as “all individuals who 
are or will be detained within the State of New Jersey 
pursuant to . . . 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), and who have a 
substantial challenge to ‘threshold deportability’ or 
‘inadmissibility’ on one of the statutory grounds that trigger 
mandatory detention.”  Third Mot. to Certify (D.Ct. Dkt. No. 
96).  The District Court then denied the third motion to certify 
on the grounds that certification was “unnecessary” because 
its rulings on the merits of the claims meant that “all aliens 
who are subjected to mandatory detention would benefit from 
the injunctive relief and remedies that this Court has 
imposed.”  Gayle II, 81 F. Supp. 3d at 404.  Appellants now 
appeal the January 28, 2015 order as to both the District 
Court’s merits determination and its denial of class 
certification.5 
                                              
 5 The Government cross-appealed the summary 
judgment order and sought an appellate determination of 
whether Form I-286 is constitutionally deficient but 
ultimately withdrew that appeal.   
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II. 
 The District Court had statutory jurisdiction pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 2241.  We have statutory 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “We review legal 
determinations de novo, factual findings for clear error, and 
matters committed to the District Court’s discretion for abuse 
thereof.”  United States v. Doe, 810 F.3d 132, 142 (3d Cir. 
2015). 
III. 
 On appeal, Appellants, joined by numerous amici, 
challenge the merits of the District Court’s substantive and 
procedural due process rulings, as well as its denial of their 
motion to certify a class, and the Government has responded 
point by point.  Yet, as the parties conceded at oral argument 
in response to inquiry by the Court, Oral Arg. at 17:56, 38:01 
(argued Feb. 10, 2016),6 the District Court did not have 
authority to reach the merits.  Nor do we.  The District 
Court’s judgment therefore must be vacated and the case 
remanded for consideration of the only issue over which it 
had jurisdiction: the motion for class certification.   
 We reach this conclusion for three reasons.  First, 
because the claims of the individual class representatives 
were long ago moot and no mootness exception applies, the 
District Court exceeded its jurisdiction in reaching the merits.  
Second, under the well-recognized exception to mootness in 
U.S. Parole Commission v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 (1980), 
because the motion to certify a class was filed at a point in 
                                              
6 Available at http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/
oralargument/audio/15-1785Gaylev.WardenMonmouth.mp3. 
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time when at least one putative representative had a live 
claim, the District Court had jurisdiction to consider that 
motion even though the putative representatives’ claims 
became moot.  Third, in denying the motion to certify a class, 
the District Court erred by disregarding the Rule 23 criteria 
and instead relying exclusively on the ground that a class 
action was “unnecessary” because it would serve no useful 
purpose given the District Court’s merits rulings—rulings it 
had no jurisdiction to make. 
A. 
 We begin our case where we must begin every case: 
with the question of jurisdiction.  Article III of the 
Constitution gives federal courts jurisdiction only over 
“Cases” and “Controversies.”  U.S. Const., art. III, § 2.  As a 
federal court, we must assure ourselves that we have Article 
III jurisdiction in every case that comes before us.  Friends of 
the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 
167, 180 (2000).  A court has jurisdiction only if the claims 
before it are not moot.  See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 
547 U.S. 332, 341-42, 352 (2006).  The mootness doctrine 
imposes two requirements: (1) that the underlying dispute 
presents “live” issues, and (2) that the parties have “a legally 
cognizable interest in the outcome”—that is, a personal stake 
in the dispute.  Chafin v. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. 1017, 1023 
(2013) (quoting Already, LLC v.  Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721, 
726 (2013)).  The parties must have a personal stake in the 
litigation not only at its inception, but throughout its 
existence.  Id. at 1023.  Therefore, “if developments occurring 
during the course of adjudication eliminate a plaintiff’s 
personal stake in the outcome of a suit, then a federal court 
must dismiss the case as moot.”  Rosetti v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 
1216, 1224 (3d Cir. 1993). 
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 Here, we conclude that the District Court lacked 
jurisdiction—at least to reach the merits—as Appellants’ 
individual claims were moot long before it issued the relevant 
orders.  Each Appellant sought a bond hearing in an effort to 
obtain release from custody.  But Gayle was granted habeas 
relief and released on bond in March 2013.  See Gayle v. 
Napolitano, No. 3:12-cv-02806, 2013 WL 1090993 (D.N.J. 
Mar. 15, 2013).  Sukhu was released on May 8, 2013, after 
the immigration judge granted his application for adjustment 
of status.  And Francois was released on bond on August 30, 
2013, after the District Court ordered that he be given a bond 
hearing pursuant to Diop v. ICE/Homeland Security, 656 F.3d 
221 (3d Cir. 2011).  See Francois v. Napolitano, No. 3:12-cv-
02806, 2013 WL 4510004 (D.N.J. Aug. 23, 2013).  His 
removal was terminated on September 26, 2013, and the 
deadline for the Government to appeal that determination 
expired on October 28, 2013, see 8 C.F.R. 1003.38(b) and 
from that point, there was no effective relief the District Court 
could provide.  In short, Appellants’ individual claims for 
relief have been moot for nearly three years.7 
                                              
 7 Ironically, as early as May 2013, Appellants’ counsel 
alerted the District Court to the problem of mootness for 
named representatives Gayle and Sukhu and advised the 
District Court “[w]e may have others the next time we come 
back.”  May 10, 2013 Hr’g Tr. at 45 (D.Ct. Dkt. No. 54).  But 
no others were added to cure mootness, and it appears that, 
after the District Court dismissed Gayle’s and Sukhu’s claims 
as moot on May 13, 2013, neither the parties nor the District 
Court concerned themselves again with the issue of the 
Court’s jurisdiction. 
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 Although not urged by the parties, we have considered 
whether the exception to mootness for disputes “‘capable of 
repetition’ while ‘evading review’” might apply to salvage 
Appellants’ individual claims.  See Turner v. Rogers, 564 
U.S. 431, 439 (2011) (quoting S. Pac. Terminal Co. v. 
Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911)).  
That exception applies “if (1) the challenged action is in its 
duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or 
expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the 
same complaining party will be subjected to the same action 
again,” id. at 439-40 (quoting Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 
147, 149 (1975) (per curiam)).  We have held that detention 
pursuant to § 1226(c) may “evade review” where it is 
temporary and “the underlying removal proceedings 
justifying detention may very well be nearing a resolution by 
the time a federal court of appeals is prepared to consider 
them,” Diop, 656 F.3d at 227 and it is capable of repetition 
when an alien has been mandatorily detained based on a prior 
conviction but also has another prior conviction that would 
justify mandatory detention, id. at 228; see also United States 
ex rel. Forman v. McCall, 709 F.2d 852, 855 n.9 (3d Cir. 
1983) (finding an inmate’s challenge to parole procedures not 
moot even after he was paroled because the parole 
commission reserved the right to void his parole if the district 
court’s order granting relief was reversed or vacated). 
 None of those circumstances pertain here.  Sukhu’s 
application for status adjustment was granted and his removal 
proceedings were terminated on April 30, 2013, while 
Francois’s removal was cancelled on September 26, 2013.  
Thus, unless they commit qualifying crimes in the future, 
these named representatives have no reasonable prospect of 
being subjected to removal proceedings, much less mandatory 
14 
 
detention pursuant to § 1226(c).  Gayle’s case presents a 
closer question as his removal proceedings were still ongoing 
at the time the District Court rendered its merits decisions, so 
there was at least a theoretical possibility that he could have 
been detained again if he had another prior conviction that 
triggered mandatory detention.  See Diop, 656 F.3d at 228.  
As the parties concede, however, he did not.8   
                                              
 8 In addition to Gayle’s 2007 drug conviction, which 
served as the basis for his mandatory detention, he was 
arrested for marijuana possession in 2008 and 2011, which 
resulted in convictions for disorderly conduct under New 
York Penal Law § 240.20.  But disorderly conduct in New 
York is not an aggravated felony, see 8 U.S.C. 
§§ 1101(a)(43), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii); N.Y. Penal Law 
§§ 70.15(4), 240.20 (stating that disorderly conduct is a 
“violation” punishable by no more than 15 days’ 
incarceration), or a drug offense, see 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i); In re Zamora, 2008 WL 655924, at *1 
(B.I.A. Feb. 14, 2008) (unpublished); cf. In re Gomez-Rivas, 
2011 WL 4730892 (B.I.A. Sept. 27, 2011) (unpublished).  
Nor are these convictions for disorderly conduct generally 
considered crimes involving moral turpitude.  See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), (ii); Application for Waiver of Grounds of 
Inadmissibility, 2010 WL 4686668, at *2 (DHS Apr. 16, 
2010); Pet. for Immigrant Abused Spouse, 2013 WL 5504790, 
at *5 & n.2 (DHS Feb. 14, 2013).  Gayle’s 1995 controlled 
substances conviction also could not subject him to 
mandatory detention under § 1226(c) because the statute 
applies only to aliens released from physical custody after the 
statute’s effective date, see Saysana v. Gillen, 590 F.3d 7, 10 
& n.2, 15 n.5, 16-17 & n.6 (1st Cir. 2009); In re West, 22 I. & 
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 In sum, Appellants had received the very relief they 
sought and presented no live individual claim to the District 
Court well before that court issued its opinion and order of 
March 14, 2014, partially granting the Government’s motion 
to dismiss and ruling on the merits of Appellants’ substantive 
due process claim, or its opinion and summary judgment 
order of January 28, 2015, ruling on the merits of the 
remaining claims, granting partial relief, and denying class 
certification on the ground that the relief it granted rendered 
certification unnecessary.  Accordingly, the District Court 
                                                                                                     
N. Dec. 1405, 1410 (B.I.A. 2000); see also Lora v. Shanahan, 
804 F.3d 601, 609-10 (2d Cir. 2015), and Gayle was paroled 
before the statute went into effect in 1998.   
 
 At oral argument, Gayle’s counsel informed us that he 
is facing new criminal charges for petty larceny but that these 
charges “will in all likelihood be dismissed.”  Oral Arg. at 
3:08.  In any event, a later conviction subjecting Gayle to 
mandatory detention does not “unmoot” the case and 
retroactively confer jurisdiction.  Similarly, the possibility 
that Gayle might commit crimes in the future does not keep 
his claim alive absent some indication that Gayle is unable to 
follow the law.  See, e.g., Turner, 544 U.S. at 440 (holding 
that a petitioner’s suit challenging his previous incarceration 
for failing to pay child support was not moot because there 
was “a more than ‘reasonable’ likelihood that Turner will 
again be ‘subjected to the same action’” in light of numerous 
failures to pay). 
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lacked jurisdiction to enter those orders and they must be 
vacated.9 
B. 
 Had this case involved only Appellants’ individual 
claims, federal jurisdiction would be absent, as in the District 
Court, and this case would be at an end.  But class claims can 
breathe life into an otherwise moot case for they “allow a 
plaintiff to continue seeking class certification in certain 
circumstances even though his individual claim for relief has 
become moot.”  Richardson v. Bledsoe, --F.3d--, 2016 WL 
3854216, at *3 (3d Cir. July 15, 2016).  As relevant here, so 
long as a plaintiff files a motion to certify a class when he still 
has a live claim, the mooting of that claim while the motion is 
pending precludes the court from reaching the merits but does 
not preclude it from deciding the certification motion.  
Holmes v. Pension Plan of Bethlehem Steel Corp., 213 F.3d 
124, 135 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 397.10  
                                              
 9 The relief ordered by the District Court appears to 
have exceeded its jurisdiction in yet another respect: Federal 
courts, other than the Supreme Court, are deprived of 
jurisdiction “to enjoin or restrain the operation of [§ 1226(c)] 
other than with respect to the application of such provisions 
to an individual alien.”  8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1); see also Alli v. 
Decker, 650 F.3d 1007, 1016 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that 
§ 1252(f)(1) permits classwide declaratory relief).  Thus, 
despite its conclusion to the contrary, see Gayle I, 4 F. Supp. 
3d at 721, it seems the scope of the injunction entered by the 
District Court also exceeded its authority.   
 
 10 We are bound by our longstanding precedent 
interpreting Geraghty to mean that a district court retains 
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This is because a plaintiff’s claim that he should represent the 
class is one that is “presented . . . in a concrete factual setting 
and [with] self-interested parties vigorously advocating 
opposing positions,” and such a claim “remains as a concrete, 
sharply presented issue” even if the plaintiff’s individual 
claims expire.  Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 403-04.  For the same 
reason, the named plaintiff may appeal the denial of a motion 
to certify the class, id. at 404, as long as he “had a live claim 
when he filed for class certification” and “appellate review 
may reverse an erroneous denial of class certification that, ‘if 
                                                                                                     
jurisdiction to decide a motion to certify as long as the 
individual plaintiff had a live claim at the time it was filed.  
See Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 975 F.2d 964, 977 n.19 (3d Cir. 
1992); Wilkerson v. Bowen, 828 F.2d 117, 121 (3d Cir. 1987).  
As we have previously observed, some Courts of Appeals 
hold that a plaintiff’s individual claims must remain live at 
the time the motion to certify a class is decided, not merely 
filed, relying on Geraghty’s dictum that “[i]f the named 
plaintiff has no personal stake in the outcome at the time class 
certification is denied, relation back of appellate reversal of 
that denial still would not prevent mootness of the action,” 
Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 404 n.11.  See, e.g., Lusardi, 975 F.2d 
at 977 n.19 (collecting cases).  But unless and until the 
Supreme Court has clearly taken a contrary view or we revisit 
our own precedent en banc, we will continue to adhere to the 
rule of Wilkerson and Lusardi.  See In re Carco Elecs., 536 
F.3d 211, 214 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting “strong statements” in 
Supreme Court opinions suggesting that a prior Third Circuit 
decision was “flawed” but stating that overruling that 
decision “must be left to the wise counsel of the Court en 
banc”). 
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correctly decided, would have prevented the action from 
becoming moot,’” Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 975 F.2d 964, 977 
(3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 404 n.11), 
because “the corrected ruling ‘relates back’ to the date of the 
original denial,” Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 404 n.11.11  Thus, the 
critical question is whether a plaintiff had a live claim at the 
time the operative motion to certify was filed. 
 In this case, the answer to that question is not as 
simple as it might seem because Appellants technically filed 
three different motions to certify.  While at least one 
Appellant had standing at the time the first was filed in 
November 2012, each Appellant’s claims had become moot 
before the filing of the second motion to certify, much less 
the third motion, which is the one the District Court decided 
on January 28, 2015 and the subject of this appeal.  Thus, this 
case requires us to decide how Geraghty’s class mootness 
rule should apply to sequentially filed motions for class 
certification.   
 We considered this issue once before in Lusardi.  
There, the district court had conditionally certified a class 
under the Age Discrimination and Employment Act but later 
decertified it on the ground that the members of the proposed 
class were not similarly situated; the plaintiffs’ individual 
                                              
 11 As we recently observed, a plaintiff also may 
continue to seek certification if his claims became moot after 
he filed a class complaint but before he filed for class 
certification where the defendant “picked off” the plaintiff by 
mooting his individual claim before he had a fair opportunity 
to seek certification.  See Richardson, 2016 WL 3854216, at 
*10.  That is not the situation here. 
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claims then became moot, and after the case was reassigned 
to another judge, plaintiffs sought a de novo hearing on class 
certification to recertify the class or to certify four subclasses.  
975 F.2d at 967-69.  The district judge agreed with 
defendants that “the dismissal of plaintiffs’ individual claims 
deprived the district court of jurisdiction to address the merits 
of class recertification,” id. at 969, and we affirmed, rejecting 
plaintiffs’ argument that their de novo certification motion 
“‘relates back’ to and would correct [the original judge’s] 
assertedly erroneous class decertification, decided when they 
still had live claims,” id. at 978. 
  The Government argues that Lusardi compels the 
same result in this case—that is, that Appellants’ third motion 
to certify was a de novo motion filed after Appellants’ 
individual claims expired and was therefore unreviewable by 
the District Court.  See Gov’t’s Ltr. Br. 5.  Appellants, on the 
other hand, urge that Lusardi is inapposite because neither 
Appellants’ first nor second motions for class certification 
were resolved based on an analysis of the Rule 23 factors; the 
District Court simply deferred that analysis until the third 
motion, so that all three should be considered one 
“continuously pending” motion.  See Appellants’ Ltr. Br. 7.   
 Appellants have the better of the argument.  We 
acknowledged in Lusardi that so long as the named 
representative has a live claim at the time the motion is filed, 
Geraghty’s relation-back doctrine applies and the 
representative’s “private dispute, although mooted, essentially 
carrie[s] forward for the limited purpose of arguing a 
reviewable motion through to completion.”  Lusardi, 975 
F.2d at 976 (emphasis added).  The plaintiffs in that case, 
however, had seen their original motion to completion when 
the class was decertified for failure to comply with the 
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certification requirements; those plaintiffs were now seeking 
to have the reassigned judge “decide the question entirely 
anew” in “a de novo hearing [that] would require the creation 
of an entirely new record and adjudication of complicated 
class considerations . . . at a time when the interests of 
putative class representatives may no longer be squarely 
adverse to defendant or wholly in line with absent ‘class’ 
members.” Id. at 981.12  That, we concluded, would stretch 
Geraghty’s relation-back doctrine beyond the breaking point 
“[b]ecause a determination on the merits of the [class 
certification] motion ‘could not relate back into a void.’”  Id. 
at 978 (quoting Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1035 (11th 
Cir. 1987)).   
 There was no such void here, however, in Appellants’ 
efforts to litigate their original motion to completion or, 
hence, in the District Court’s jurisdiction.  The first motion to 
certify was not denied for failure to satisfy Rule 23 criteria.  
Instead, it was denied solely so that further discovery could 
be completed “without prejudice pending an expanded record 
and/or discovery.”  Gayle, 3:12-cv-02806, ECF No. 50, at 2.  
Likewise, the District Court terminated the second motion, 
not as a final adjudication of certification, but with express 
instruction that Appellants refile a motion to certify a class 
“limited to those individuals who are entitled to a Joseph 
                                              
 12 Crucially, the plaintiffs in Lusardi failed to properly 
appeal the decertification order that extinguished their class 
claims by omitting it from their notice of appeal.  As a result, 
we could not review the initial certification decision.  See 
Lusardi, 975 F.2d at 970-73.  No such defect prevents our 
review of the class certification denial in the instant case. 
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hearing consistent” the court’s elimination of certain claims 
in Gayle I.  Gayle I, 4 F. Supp. 3d at 721-22.  Thus, the 
successive motions were substantially similar and required no 
additional discovery, and until the District Court ruled on the 
third motion, there was no denial of class certification based 
on a Rule 23 analysis or other intervening event that could be 
deemed to break the jurisdictional chain.   
 Our holding today—that Geraghty’s relation-back 
doctrine encompasses successive, substantially similar 
motions to certify unless and until certification has been 
finally resolved on Rule 23 grounds—comports with the logic 
of Geraghty and the practicalities of litigation.13  A plaintiff 
who files a motion to certify a class prior to the expiration of 
his individual claims does not lose his “interest in accurate 
resolution of his legitimate efforts to serve as class 
representative,” Lusardi, 975 F.2d at 976, merely because the 
District Court, as a technical matter, denies or terminates the 
motion without actually deciding it.  Rather, his stake 
“carrie[s] forward for the limited purpose of arguing a 
reviewable motion through to completion,” id., and the 
                                              
 13 We need not decide whether a different result would 
be warranted where plaintiff’s successive motion was so 
substantially different that it “would require the creation of an 
entirely new record and adjudication of complicated class 
considerations . . . at a time when the interests of the putative 
class representatives may no longer be squarely adverse to 
defendant or wholly in line with absent ‘class’ members.” 
Lusardi, at 981.  Here, the first and second motions to certify 
were essentially the same, while the third simply narrowed 
the class consistent with Gayle I. 
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certification question remains concrete and fit for judicial 
resolution, see Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 402-04.   
 Moreover, as the drafters of Rule 23 recognize, “there 
are ‘many valid reasons that may justify deferring the initial 
certification decision’” to a later period in the litigation.  
Richardson, 2016 WL 3854216, at *6 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 23 advisory committee’s note to the 2003 amendment).   
Yet district judges must also manage busy dockets, and one 
who intends to defer ruling, for example, pending additional 
discovery relevant to Rule 23 criteria, might reasonably 
decide to deny such a motion without prejudice rather than 
hold it in abeyance for months on end.  See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. 
§ 476 (requiring semiannual public disclosure of the number 
of motions that have been pending on each district judge’s 
docket for more than six months).  To hold that a plaintiff’s 
certification claim is extinguished by such a denial would 
enfeeble the “flexible character” of the mootness doctrine, 
Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 400, and unmoor it from the realities of 
litigation.  
 Indeed, consider the implications of applying Lusardi 
to the facts of this case.  If the District Court had jurisdiction 
only over the first motion to certify, our appellate jurisdiction 
would extend only to its order on that motion—an order 
denying the motion without prejudice to additional discovery.  
Yet that order is unreviewable: It is not a final order within 
the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, see Hagan v. Rogers, 570 
F.3d 146, 151 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[A]n order dismissing a 
complaint without prejudice is normally not final within the 
meaning of [28 U.S.C.] § 1291.”), nor is it subject to 
interlocutory appeal under Rule 23(f), see In re Nat’l Football 
League Players Concussion Litig., 775 F.3d 570, 584 (3d Cir. 
2014) (stating that an order “conditionally” certifying a class 
23 
 
under Rule 23(e) “but reserv[ing] the class certification 
determination for a later time,” and similar “order[s] issued 
under some other subdivision of Rule 23” are not subject to 
interlocutory review under Rule 23(f)).  That would mean the 
district court’s denial without prejudice—now 
unchallangeable in the district court and unreviewable on 
appeal—would preclude the plaintiff from obtaining a review 
of his right to represent a class.  Geraghty dictates otherwise.  
445 U.S. at 401-04 (explaining that a plaintiff retains the 
“right” to seek to represent a class even after his personal 
claim has become moot).  
 In short, the District Court had jurisdiction to decide 
Appellants’ third motion to certify, and we now turn to the 
question of whether its denial of that motion was proper. 
C. 
 The sole ground for the District Court’s denial of class 
certification in this case was that it “d[id] not find 
certification of a class necessary.”  Gayle II, 81 F. Supp. 3d at 
403.  As explained below, that was error, for “necessity” is 
not an express requirement of Rule 23, and the criteria the 
District Court was required to consider are wholly absent 
from its discussion.  
 To maintain a class action under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23, a plaintiff must first show that “the class is so 
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable” 
(numerosity); that “there are questions of law or fact common 
to the class” (commonality); that “the claims or defenses of 
the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses 
of the class” (typicality); and that “the representative parties 
will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class” 
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(adequacy).  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).  Second, the plaintiff 
must show that the class action falls within one of the three 
types enumerated in Rule 23(b)—in this case, Rule 23(b)(2), 
which provides that “[a] class action may be maintained” if 
“the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on 
grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final 
injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is 
appropriate respecting the class as a whole.”  “Class 
certification is proper only ‘if the trial court is satisfied, after 
a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites’ of Rule 23 are 
met.”  In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 
309 & n.5 (3d Cir. 2008), as amended (Jan. 16, 2009) 
(quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 
(1982)).  
 Here, the District Court denied class certification as 
not “necessary” because a Rule 23(b)(2) class is limited to 
injunctive and declaratory relief and the court’s declaration as 
to the unconstitutionality of the government’s procedures and 
its grant of injunctive relief on an individual basis “would be 
binding on all of the governmental agencies and would indeed 
inure to the benefit of all members of the proposed class.”  
See Gayle II, 81 F. Supp. 3d at 403.  In assuming a 
“necessity” requirement, the District Court relied on Ihrke v. 
N. States Power Co., 459 F.2d 566 (8th Cir.), vacated on 
other grounds sub nom., N. States Power Co. v. Ihrke, 409 
U.S. 815 (1972), in which the Eighth Circuit held a court may 
deny certification of a 23(b)(2) class where “[t]he 
determination of the constitutional question can be made by 
the Court . . . regardless of whether [the] action is treated as 
an individual action or a class action.  No useful purpose 
would be served by permitting [such a] case to proceed as a 
class action.”  Id. at 572. 
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 The role of “necessity” in our own Circuit, however, 
has been an open question.  Although the Government asserts 
that we adopted a freestanding necessity requirement in 
Carter v. Butz, 479 F.2d 1084, 1089 (3d Cir. 1973), our 
opinion in that case and subsequent cases make clear we did 
no such thing.  True, in Carter, we affirmed the district 
court’s denial of certification as “within the range of 
discretion permitted by Rule 23” when one of the rationales 
offered by the district court was that “the precedential value 
of its decision would render a judgment in favor of the class 
unnecessary,” but the district court also had found a 
traditional Rule 23 factor, commonality, to be lacking.  Id.  
Moreover, just a few years after Carter, we explicitly stated 
that a plaintiff seeking Rule 23 certification “need not . . . 
prove[] that certification [is] ‘necessary,’ but only that there 
was compliance with the prerequisites of Rule 23.”  Geraghty 
v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 579 F.2d 238, 252 (3d Cir. 1978), 
vacated on other grounds sub nom., Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 
(1980).   
 Before answering this question, we consider the views 
of our sister Circuits—views that turn out to be wide-ranging.  
The Seventh Circuit has expressly rejected the contention that 
a district court can deny certification as unnecessary, see, e.g., 
Brown v. Scott, 602 F.2d 791, 795 (7th Cir. 1979), while other 
Circuits have affirmed the denial of class certification on that 
ground, at least in the Rule 23(b)(2) context, see, e.g., Galvan 
v. Levine, 490 F.2d 1255, 1261 (2d Cir. 1973); Sandford v. R. 
L. Coleman Realty Co., 573 F.2d 173, 178-79 (4th Cir. 1978); 
Craft v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 534 F.2d 684, 686 
(6th Cir. 1976); James v. Ball, 613 F.2d 180, 186 (9th Cir. 
1979), reversed on other grounds,  Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 
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355 (1981); Kan. Health Care Ass’n v. Kan. Dep’t of Soc. & 
Rehab. Servs., 31 F.3d 1536, 1548 (10th Cir. 1994).   
 The First Circuit has staked out a middle ground, 
observing in light of Rule 23(b)(2)’s express requirement 
“that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief 
[be] appropriate respecting the class as a whole,” Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 23(b)(2) (emphasis added), that certification under 
Rule 23(b)(2) may be denied where classwide relief is 
unnecessary because such relief is then a “formality or 
otherwise inappropriate.”  Dionne v. Bouley, 757 F.2d 1344, 
1356 (1st Cir. 1985).  At the same time, the court recognized 
that “[t]here may . . . be situations where a class certification 
under Rule 23(b)(2) will arguably be unnecessary, but where 
other considerations may render a denial of certification 
improper,” such as the risk of mootness, the possibility of a 
defendant’s non-acquiescence in the court’s decision, or 
where class certification would not burden the court.  Id. at 
1356.  We find the First Circuit’s approach persuasive.   
 Accordingly, we hold today that necessity is not a 
freestanding requirement justifying the denial of class 
certification.14  However, it may be considered to the extent it 
                                              
 14 Indeed, requiring “necessity” over and above Rule 
23’s enumerated criteria would create conflict with Shady 
Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 
393 (2010)—in which the Supreme Court emphasized the 
primacy of Rule 23’s enumerated criteria, explaining that the 
Rule admonishes that “if [Rule 23’s] prescribed preconditions 
are satisfied ‘[a] class action may be maintained’ (emphasis 
added)—not ‘a class action may be permitted.’ . . . The 
discretion suggested by Rule 23’s ‘may’ is discretion residing 
in the plaintiff,” id. at 399-40 —and Geraghty itself—in 
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is relevant to the enumerated Rule 23 criteria, including “that 
final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief [be] 
appropriate respecting the class as a whole.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
23(b)(2).  That is, there may be circumstances where class 
certification is not appropriate because in view of the 
declaratory or injunctive relief ordered on an individual basis, 
there would be no meaningful additional benefit to 
prospective class members in ordering classwide relief.  See, 
e.g., Galvan, 490 F.2d at 1261-62 (affirming a district court’s 
denial of class certification because the defendant “has made 
clear that it understands the judgment to bind it with respect 
to all claimants; indeed even before entry of the judgment, it 
withdrew the challenged policy even more fully than the court 
ultimately directed and stated it did not intend to reinstate the 
policy”). 
 The circumstances in which classwide relief offers no 
further benefit, however, will be rare, and courts should 
                                                                                                     
which the Court stated that “[Rule 23] give[s] the proposed 
class representative the right to have a class certified if the 
requirements of the Rule[] are met,” 445 U.S. at 403.  In 
addition, to the extent necessity would require a showing that 
a class action was “superior to other available methods for 
fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy,” as 
required under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3), such a requirement 
would be in tension with the absence of a “superiority” 
requirement in Rule 23(b)(2), see Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 
Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 362-63 (2011) (observing that a 
putative class representative need not show that a Rule 
23(b)(2) “class action is a superior method of adjudicating the 
dispute” because in 23(b)(2) cases, “superiority [is] self-
evident”). 
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exercise great caution before denying class certification on 
that basis.  After all, the imposition of individual relief is no 
guarantee it will be carried over to other class members.  See 
Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 626 F.2d 1132, 1136-37 (3d Cir. 
1980) (recognizing in a different context that stare decisis 
alone will not always cause a defendant to abide by a holding 
with respect to similarly situated individuals and that, in such 
circumstances, a district court might need to grant more 
“effective remedial relief”). Indeed, as the Government 
cautioned in its briefing on appeal, “as a matter of practice, 
the Department of Justice may choose to acquiesce in a 
particular district court decision, but such acquiescence is not 
as a matter of law,” Gov’t’s Ltr.. Br. at 1, and that is borne 
out in practice.  For example, even when a Court of Appeals 
has struck down a law or regulation, the Government has 
sometimes ceased enforcement only in that circuit and 
otherwise continued to apply it nationwide.  E.g., Cen v. Att’y 
Gen., --F.3d--, 2016 WL 3166013, at *5 (3d Cir. June 6, 
2016). 
 Where class certification is denied on the ground of 
necessity, yet would-be class members continue to be 
subjected to injury, their only option may be to undertake the 
expense, burden, and risk of instituting their own litigation—
barriers that in many cases will be prohibitive.  The 
consequences can be significant for those who would 
otherwise benefit from the relief afforded by Rule 23(b)(2), a 
rule “designed specifically for civil rights cases seeking broad 
declaratory or injunctive relief for a numerous and often 
unascertainable or amorphous class of persons.”  Baby Neal 
ex rel. Kanter v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 59 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(quoting 1 Newberg & Conte, Newberg on Class Actions 
§ 4.11, at 4-39 (1992)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory 
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committee’s note (1966) (explaining that “[i]llustrative” of 
Rule 23(b)(2) class actions “are various actions in the civil-
rights field where a party is charged with discriminating 
unlawfully against a class, usually one whose members are 
incapable of specific enumeration”).  A failure to exercise 
careful scrutiny before denying certification as unnecessary 
risks “plac[ing] the defendant in the driver’s seat,” and 
allowing the defendant to, in essence, unilaterally prevent 
classwide relief.  Cf. Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. 
Ct. 663, 672 (2016) (rejecting a defendant’s “gambit” to moot 
a Rule 23(b)(3) class action by offering a settlement that the 
named plaintiffs did not accept).15   
                                              
 15 Moreover, absent the attorneys’ fees provided by 
class treatment, attorneys may well be less willing to seek 
individual relief on plaintiffs’ behalf.  After all, the class 
action device is designed in part to spur attorneys “who 
otherwise might not consider it worth the candle to embark on 
litigation in which the optimum result might be more than 
consumed by the cost.  The prospect of [class action] fee 
arrangements offers advantages for litigation by named 
plaintiffs . . . as well as for their attorneys.”  See Deposit 
Guaranty Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 338 (1980); see 
also Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 
(1997) (“The policy at the very core of the class action 
mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries 
do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo 
action . . . .  A class action solves this problem by aggregating 
the relatively paltry potential recoveries into something worth 
someone’s (usually an attorney’s) labor.” (quoting Mace v. 
Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997))).   
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 With these concerns in mind, courts must engage in a 
“rigorous analysis” of the appropriateness of 23(b)(2) relief, 
as well as the other Rule 23 criteria, before denying class 
certification.  See Falcon, 457 U.S. at 160-61; Byrd v. 
Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 163 (3d Cir. 2015).  As our sister 
Circuits have recognized, a court must do more than assume 
or hypothesize that a ruling on the claims of an individual 
plaintiff will accrue to the benefit of the class.  See, e.g. 
Galvan, 490 F.2d at 1261-62; Kan. Health Care Ass’n., 31 
F.3d at 1548 (affirming the district court’s denial of 
certification in a challenge to a state’s Medicare 
reimbursement plan as unnecessary because the district court 
found that “we have no reason to doubt that defendants would 
apply any changes made to the reimbursement formula 
uniformly to nursing homes in Kansas”).   
 Rather, courts should scrutinize with care the 
representation that classwide relief is not necessary and 
consider, among other things: (1) the nature of the claims and 
of the parties; (2) the relief available to an individual plaintiff 
and the extent to which that relief would benefit putative class 
members;16 (3) the strength of the evidence that a defendant 
will abide by a court’s ruling on an individual plaintiff’s 
claim with respect to others who are similarly situated; (4) the 
                                              
 16 Compare Baeder v. Heckler, 768 F.2d 547, 553 (3d 
Cir. 1985) (holding that the district court lacked the authority 
to enjoin a federal agency’s treatment of anyone other than 
the individual plaintiffs in that case), with Gurmankin, 626 
F.2d at 1136 (accepting a defendant’s concession that, even 
where a class has not been certified, “the district court has the 
ability to render relief which is operative beyond the named 
plaintiff”). 
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ease with which putative class members would be able to 
vindicate their rights following a defendant’s noncompliance; 
and (5) whether there are other circumstances, such as 
impending mootness of the individual claims, that 
nonetheless render classwide relief “appropriate”, Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 23(b)(2).17  To facilitate appellate review, courts 
                                              
 17 Of course, if a putative class action does not meet 
the requirements of Rule 23, then a class may not be certified, 
regardless of any implications for mootness.  Cf. Geraghty, 
579 F.2d at 252 (“[A] possibility of avoiding mootness on 
appeal would not, of itself, be a sufficient basis for conferring 
class action status on a suit otherwise barred by Rule 23.”).  
However, if the prerequisites of Rule 23 are otherwise met, 
the impending mootness of individual claims counsels in 
favor of certification regardless of whether individual relief 
would theoretically render classwide relief unnecessary.  For 
in that situation, class certification may be the only way to 
provide relief.  See Winston by Winston v. Children and Youth 
Servs. of Del. Cnty., 948 F.2d 1380, 1384 n.2 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(suggesting that a district court should certify a class where it 
would prevent a case from becoming moot); see also Gratz v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 268 (2003) (stating that “class-action 
treatment was particularly important in this case because” the 
individual claims might have become moot); Dionne, 757 
F.2d at 1344 (“There may . . . be situations where a class 
certification under Rule 23(b)(2) will arguably be 
unnecessary, but where other considerations may render a 
denial of a certification improper,” such as the risk of 
mootness.); Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065, 
1070 (5th Cir. Unit A Oct. 1981) (stating that “[c]ertification 
of a class under Rule 23(b)(2) is ‘especially appropriate 
where, as here, the claims of the members of the class may 
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should make explicit findings before denying class 
certification on the ground that classwide relief is not 
appropriate.  
 Here, without the benefit of the guidance we have 
provided today, the District Court denied class certification 
on the ground that “no useful purpose would be served by 
certifying a class because all aliens who are subjected to 
mandatory detention would benefit from the injunctive relief 
and remedies that this court has imposed.”  Gayle II, 81 F. 
Supp. 3d at 404.  Because the District Court did not have 
jurisdiction to enter the relief on which it predicated its ruling 
and because it did not engage in the “rigorous analysis” of 
Rule 23 criteria that we have required, we will remand for the 
District Court to reconsider Appellants’ motion to certify18 
and to conduct that analysis in the first instance.19   
                                                                                                     
become moot as the case progresses’” and holding, therefore, 
that the district court “abused its discretion in refusing to 
certify an otherwise appropriate class because of ‘lack of 
need’” (quoting Adams v. Califano, 474 F. Supp. 974, 979 (D. 
Md. 1979))); Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50, 64 (3d Cir. 
1980) (stating that Rule 23(b)(2) serves the important purpose 
of “ensur[ing] that the claims of unnamed plaintiffs will 
receive full appellate review” should the named plaintiffs’ 
claims become moot). 
 
 18 On remand, the Appellants are not confined to 
arguing their third motion to certify, which was filed in 
response to merits rulings the District Court had no 
jurisdiction to make.  Instead, the Appellants may opt to 
proceed with their second motion to certify or to file an 
amended motion. 
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IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District 
Court’s judgment and its orders of March 14, 2014 and 
January 28, 2015, and will remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
                                                                                                     
 
 19 Our holding that the District Court must address 
class certification as a threshold issue in the context of this 
case does not mean, of course, that a district court must 
decide the certification question before deciding other issues 
where mootness does not require it.  Indeed, the advisory 
committee’s note to the 2003 amendments to Rule 23 make 
explicit that various “considerations may affect the timing of” 
and “may justify deferring” the certification decision, 
including a defendant’s motion for dismissal or summary 
judgment or the need to explore the designation of class 
counsel—although “active management may be necessary to 
ensure that the certification decision is not unjustifiably 
delayed.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 
2003 amendment). 
